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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
under all conditions, but would make effective all endorsements within the
apparently normal chain. 8
A primary purpose of statutory construction is to fulfill the legislative in-
tent and remedy the evil that prompted the legislatlon.' Although the narrow
construction of this section of the Negotiable Instruments Law handed down
in the instant case is unquestionably in agreement with the majority of cases
todaylo it does not fufill this purpose. There can be little doubt that the
intention of the legislature in adopting § 9(3) of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law was to enhance the negotiability of negotiable instruments by pro-
tecting innocent purchasers for value. In order to effectuate this intent the
court in the instant case should have discarded the doctrine of stare decisis in
favor of a broad construction. Under the present majority rule"I the statute
is rendered ineffectual, for the security systems used in the business world of
today seldom permit the maker of a negotiable document to designate the
payee or afford him an opportunity to negotiage the instrument.
The doctrine of stare decisis is without question a firm foundation for the
guidance of our courts, but precedent, like an automobile, does become out-
moded.
BAYARD LEWIS.
INFANTS - JUVENILE COURTS - JURISDICTIONS OVER OFFENSES ARISING
UNDER MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES- The petitioners, two minors, were sentenced
to confinement in the city jail after pleading guilty to disorderly conduct be-
fore a police magistrate. They applied to the District Court, sitting in its
capacity as a juvenile court, for writs of habeas corpus. These were granted
on the ground that the police magistrate lacked jurisdiction to .try the peti-
tioners without the consent of the juvenile court. Held, order affirmed. The
constitutional provision vesting exclusive jurisdiction to try violations of muni-
cipal ordinances in the police magistrate did not authorize him to try minors
without the consent of the juvenile court. State ex rel City of Minot v.
Gronna, 59 N.W.2d 514 (N. D. 1953).
8. Uniform Commercial Code §3-405.
9. See, E. g., Houghton Miffin Co. v. Continental Ill. Nat. B.E.T. Co., 293 Ill. App.
423, 12 N.E.2d 714, 716 (1938); Schoellkopf v. DeVry, 366'I11. 39, 7 N.E.2d 757,
759 (1937) "A primary purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislative
intention."; People v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 360 Ill. 454, 196
N.E. 515, 517 (1935); People v. Hughes, 357 11. 524, 192 N.E. 551, 553 (1934)
(to find the intent of the legislature the courts will look at "the evil to be remedied and
the object to be attained").
10. E. g., Commonwealth v. Globe Indemnity Co., 323 Pa. 261, 185 AtI. 796, 798
(1936); American Sash and Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co., 332 Mo. 98, 56 S.W.2d
1034, 1040 (1933); See Swift and Company v. Bankers Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 135, 19
N.E. 992, 994 (1939).
11. Jorgenson Chevrolet Co. v. First National Bank, 217 Minn. 413, 14 N.W.2d 618,
621 (1944); City of St. Paul v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 151 Minn. 485, 187 N.W. 516,
518 (1922) "Where by the fraud of a third person a depositor of a bank is induced to
draw a check payable to a non-existing person or order, the drawer ignorant of the tact
and intending no fraud, the bank is not authorized to pay . . . although it appears to
have been previously endorsed by the party named as payee."; 24 Minn. L. Rev. 988
(1940) (where an agent with fraudulent intent is not authorized to sign but merely
supplied the name of the payee, "the general rule is that his knowledge that the payee
is fictitious cannot be imputed to the principal.").
RECENT CASES
The principles underlying the creation of juvenile courts are not new.
Their source is the common law; the juvenile court being a growth in, rather
than a departure from prior legal theory.1 A statute creating a juvenile court
is an assertion of the state's power as parens patriae and its consequent right
to exercise proper parental control over its minor citizens who are disposed to
go wrong.2 The juvenile courts have generally been upheld against various
constitutional objections to their operation, e.g., that they deprive the minor of
trial by jury, upon the theory that the delinquent child is not on trial for a
crime and is not to be punished, but is rather to be rehabilitated. 3 This, then,
is a civil action and not a criminal action. 4 Legislation creating such courts
has been characterized as an exercise of the state's police power, intended for
the protection, care, custody, maintenance and welfare of the child.5
The District Court, which is also the juvenile court, assumed jurisdiction
from its interpretation of the statute creating the juvenile court,0 whereas
the police magistrate contended that the North Dakota Constitution gave him
jurisdiction over all cases arising from violations of city ordinances.7 The case
thus presented this question, is the statute creating the juvenile court in con-
flict with the constitutional provision giving police magistrates jurisdiction
over cases arising under city ordinances?
In Mississippi the Youth Court Act of 1946,8 which vested exclusive and
original jurisdiction in all proceedings concerning delinquent children in a
juvenile court, was held by the Mississippi Supreme Court, in a five to four
decision, not to violate the constitutional provision giving original jurisdiction
over felonies to the circuit courts. 9 An Oklahoma case' held that the
district court had no jurisdiction until a delinquent minor had been certified
to it for prosecution for a felony.
1. See Flexner and Oppenheimer, The Legal Aspect of the Juvenile Court, 57 Am.
L. Rev. 65 (1923).
2. See Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 111. 328, 100 N.E. 892 (1913); Mill v. Brown, 31
Utah 473, 88 Pac. 609 (1907).
3. Wissenberg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 229 N.W. 205 (1930); State v. Brown,
50 Minn. 353, 52 N.W. 935 (1892).
4. Wissenberg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 229 N.W. 205, 207 (1930) "The action
is, in a sense, a special proceeding provided by statute, wherein the state, by virtue of ts
authority as parens patriae, takes jurisdiction of the incorrigible child . . . for its care,
education, and training."
5. State v. lssenhuth, 34 S.D. 218, 148 N.W. 9, 12 (1914). "That legislation of
this character is a valid exercise of the police power of the state is too plain to .equire
discussion or the citation of authorities."
6. N.D. Rev. Code §27-1608 (gives the juvenile court original jurisdiction in all pro-
ceedings concerning delinquents under 18 years of age).
7. N.D. Const. §113 "The legislative assembly shall provide by law for the election
of police magistrates in cities, incorporated towns, and villages, who in addition to their
jurisdiction of all cases arising from the ordinances of said cities, towns and villages, shall
be ex officio justices of the peace of the county in which said cities, towns and villages
may le located, and the legislative assembly may confer upon said police magistrate the
jurisdiction to hear, try, and determine all cases of maisdemeanors, and the prosecutions
therein shall he by information."
8. Miss. Gen. Laws 1946 c. 207.
9. Wheeler v. Shoemake, 213 Miss. 374, 57 So.2d 267 (1952) (the statute held
to be within the state's police powers) "these purposes are brought out by the basic
concept of the statute, which is, that the court proceedings thereunder are of a civil
nature by the state in the interest of the child, as opposed to criminal proceedings by the
state against the child." The dissenting opinion stated bluntly that the statute conflicts
with the constitution.
10. Ex parte Powell, 120 Pac. 1022 (Okla. Cr. 1912); Accord, Wilson v. State, 82 P.
2d 308 (Okla. Cr. 1938).
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Some statutes creating juvenile courts have been held invalid because the
jurisdiction had been conferred on courts or officers whose powers were so
limited by the constitution of the state as to exclude the exercise of the in-
tended powers." Section 103 of the North Dakota Constitution which defines
the jurisdiction of the District Courts also limits that jurisdiction as provided
elsewhere in the Constitution. Section 113 gives to police magistrates juris-
diction over all cases arising under city ordinances and this would appear to
be a limitation on the jurisdiction of the District courts. The dissenting
judges in the instant case so considered it.12
The contention of the majority in the instant case was that a municipality,
being a creature of the state, has only those powers granted to it by the legis-
lature. But the legislature, in passing the juvenile court act, limited the opera-
tion of municipal ordinances and not the jurisdiction of city magistrates to
hear cases arising under those ordinances. Thus the majority circumvented
what appeared to be a conflict between a statute and a constitutional pro-
vision. This reasoning appears to give the legislature the indirect power to
sharply curtail the constitutionally granted jurisdiction of city magistrates.
Thus while the majority have undoubtedly reached a socially desirable
result the reasoning of the minority seems more in keeping with strict legal
interpretation.
JAMES A. MURRAY.
LIENS - RELATIVE PRIORITY OF FEDERAL AND MUNICIPAL STATUTORY LIENS.
-Two mortgages on the real property of a corporation were foreclosed by
judgment sale and the gross sum realized was $27,071.34. Against this fund
were $31,000 in claims, including expenses of the sale, the two mortgages, a
judgment of record, a federal statutory lien and a municipal statutory lien.
Following a Connecticut statute providing that real estate tax liens shall take
precedence over all transfers and encumbrances in any manner affecting the
property subject to the lien,' the-Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
affirmed2 the lower court's determination that the claims should be paid in
the following order: the expenses, the city's liens, the mortgages, the judg-
ment lien and the federal lien. The United States appealed ,the decision on
the ground that the city's liens should not have been given priority over
the federal liens. On certiorari the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the judgment be vacated. The relative priority of the federal and muni-
cipal claims should be determined by the principle, "first in time is first in
right." United States v. City of New Britain, Conn., 74 S.Ct. 367 (1954).
Priority of federal tax liens over other liens and encumbrances is governed
by § 3466 of the Revised Statutes3 and §§3670-2 of the Internal Revenue
11. State v. Tincher, 258 Mo. 1, 166 S.W. 1028 (1914); Pugh v. Bowden, 54 Fla.
302, 45 So. 499 (1907); Hunt v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 142 Mich. 93, 105 N.W. 531
(1905).
12. See State ex rel City of Minot v. Gronna, 59 N.W.2d 514, 541 (N.D. 1953)
(dissenting opinion).
1. Conn. Gen. Stat. 1949, c. 88, §1853.
2. Brown v. General Laundry Service, Inc., 139 Conn. 363, 94 A.2d 10 (1952).
3. Rev. Stat. §3466, 31 U.S.C. §191 (1946). "'Whenever any person indebted to
the United States is insolvent . . . the debts due to the United States shal be first
satisfied . . ."
